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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Larissa Shelton and Gregory Bohus (the “Plaintiffs”) 
appeal from an order of the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey dismissing their putative class 
action suit against Restaurant.com.  A total of five prior 
opinions have been issued in this case by, variously, the 
District Court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and our 
Court.  See Shelton v. Restaurant.com (Shelton V), No. 
CIV.A. 10-824 JAP, 2014 WL 3396505 (D.N.J. July 10, 
2014); Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc. (Shelton IV), 543 F. 
App’x 168 (3d Cir. 2013); Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc. 
(Shelton III), 70 A.3d 544 (N.J. 2013); Shelton v. 
Restaurant.com, Inc. (Shelton II), No. 10-2980, 2011 WL 
10844972 (3d Cir. May 17, 2011); Shelton v. Restaurant.com, 
Inc. (Shelton I), No. CIV. A 10-0824 (JAP), 2010 WL 
2384923 (D.N.J. June 15, 2010).  But the end, one may hope, 
is finally near.  We will reverse and remand for entry of 






 The Plaintiffs purchased gift certificates from 
Restaurant.com that allegedly violated several New Jersey 
statutes.  Restaurant.com sells gift certificates online that 
“provide a credit for the holder for purchases of food and 
beverages at the restaurant named on the certificate.”  Shelton 
IV, 543 F. App’x at 169.  “[T]he amount paid does not always 
coincide with the face amount of the certificate.”  Id. at 169 
n.2.  The gift certificate may contain conditions imposed by 
the restaurant, “such as prohibiting the use of a certificate on 
weekends or for the purchase of alcoholic beverages.”  
Shelton III, 70 A.3d at 547.  Substantially all gift certificates 
issued by Restaurant.com since April 4, 2006 – including the 
gift certificates purchased by the Plaintiffs – share the 
following characteristics: 
 
Each certificate displayed on its face various 
restaurant-specific conditions in addition to 
standard terms and conditions imposed by 
Restaurant.com.  Two standard terms and 
conditions on the … certificates were the 
following: 1) the certificate “[e]xpires one (1) 
year from date of issue, except in California and 
where otherwise provided by law[,]” and 2) the 
                                              
 1 Because we are reviewing the District Court’s ruling 
on a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we accept all well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving parties, the Plaintiffs.  




certificate is “[v]oid to the extent prohibited by 
law.” 
 
Id. at 547-48 (alterations in original). 
 
 The Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against 
Restaurant.com in New Jersey state court, and the case was 
later removed to federal court on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 548.  The class has not been certified.  The 
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges two claims: in Count I, violations 
of the New Jersey Gift Certificate Statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 56:8-110, and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1 et seq.; and, in Count II, violations of the 
Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act 
(“TCCWNA”), id. §§ 56:12-14 to 12-18.  The New Jersey 
Gift Certificate Statue prohibits gift certificates from expiring 
within 24 months of the date of sale, id. § 56:8-110(a)(1), and 
the Consumer Fraud Act provides a cause of action for 
violations of the Gift Certificate Statute, id. §§ 56:8-11, 8-
112.  The TCCWNA prohibits giving notice to a consumer or 
offering or entering into any written consumer contract that 
violates any clearly established consumer right or seller 
responsibility.  Id. § 56:12-15.  The TCCWNA also provides 
that any notice or consumer contract that states that any of its 
provisions are or may be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable 
in some jurisdictions must also specify “which provisions are 
or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State 
of New Jersey.”  Id. § 56:12-16.  The TCCWNA authorizes 
“the aggrieved consumer” to recover “a civil penalty of not 
less than $100.00 or … actual damages, or both at the election 
of the consumer, together with reasonable attorney’s fees and 




 The District Court initially granted a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim.  As to the first count, the Court 
concluded that the Plaintiffs had failed to allege any 
ascertainable loss, as is required under relevant state law.  
Shelton I, 2010 WL 2384923, at *4.  As to the second count, 
the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs were not consumers 
within the meaning of the TCCWNA because the gift 
certificates they purchased were not “money, property or 
service[s],” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:12-15, but provided only “a 
contingent right to a discount.”  Shelton I, 2010 WL 2384923, 
at *5.  We ultimately affirmed the dismissal of the first count, 
Shelton IV, 543 F. App’x at 169-70, but before resolving 
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the dismissal of the second count, we 
certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey: 
 
1. Does the TCCWNA apply to both tangible 
and intangible property, or is its scope limited 
to only tangible property? 
 
2. Does the purchase of a gift certificate, which 
is issued by a third-party internet vendor, and is 
contingent, i.e., subject to particular conditions 
that must be satisfied in order to obtain its face 
value, qualify as a transaction for “property ... 
which is primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes” so as to come within the 
definition of a “consumer contract” under 
section 15 of the TCCWNA? 
 
Shelton II, 2011 WL 10844972, at *4.  The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey accepted the certification but reformulated the 
questions as follows: 
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1. Whether Restaurant.com’s coupons, which 
were issued to plaintiffs and redeemable at 
particular restaurants, constitute “property” 
under the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer 
Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 
56:12-14 to -18; 
 
2. If the coupons constitute “property,” whether 
they are “primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes,” N.J.S.A. 56:12-15; [and] 
 
3. Whether the sale of the coupons by 
Restaurant.com to plaintiffs constituted a 
“written consumer contract,” or whether the 
coupons “gave or displayed any written 
consumer warranty, notice, or sign,” under 
N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. 
 
Shelton III, 70 A.3d at 549 (alteration in original). 
 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court then determined in a 
thorough and carefully crafted opinion – Shelton III – that the 
term “property” as used in the TCCWNA encompasses 
intangible property such as the gift certificates issued by 
Restaurant.com, id. at 554, 558-59, that the gift certificates 
were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, 
id. at 555, 558-59, that the sale of the gift certificates 
constituted a written consumer contract, id. at 556, 559, and 
that the terms listed on the gift certificates constituted notice, 
id. at 558-59.  In sum, the court concluded, “The statute as 




 Next, we vacated the District Court’s dismissal of the 
TCCWNA count and remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s explication 
of the law in Shelton III.  Shelton IV, 543 F. App’x at 171.  
Upon remand, Restaurant.com again filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that Shelton III should apply only 
prospectively.  The District Court agreed.  It acknowledged 
that decisions are ordinarily applied retroactively under New 
Jersey law.  But it concluded that retroactive application was 
inappropriate here because Shelton III established a new rule 
of law by resolving an issue of first impression, and 
retroactive application would yield substantial inequitable 
results.  The District Court acknowledged the fact-sensitive 
nature of its analysis of the equities, but it rejected the 
Plaintiffs’ argument that an evidentiary record was needed to 
reach a decision.  It instead decided that, because the 
Plaintiffs “have not suffered any actual, non-theoretical 
damages” (App. at 12) – in fact, there was “no allegation that 
Plaintiffs were unable to enjoy the bargained-for discounts at 
the third-party restaurants that they selected” – they should 
not be entitled to “windfall statutory damages and attorneys’ 
fees.”  (Id. at 13.)  In the District Court’s view, “common 
sense” dictated that the many “unsuspecting companies” that 
would be subject to the new law should be given a chance to 
change their conduct before being exposed to “extraordinary 
statutory penalties.”  (Id. at 11.)  In such a situation, the 
District Court concluded, even limited retroactive application 
to the plaintiffs in this case would be inequitable.   
 
 The Plaintiffs timely appealed the District Court’s 





 The Plaintiffs raise three main arguments challenging 
the District Court’s retroactivity ruling.  First, as a 
preliminary matter, they argue that the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey has already conducted a retroactivity analysis and 
determined that its decision was to apply to the parties in this 
case, and hence we need not revisit the issue.  Alternatively, 
they suggest that we certify the question of retroactivity to the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey.  Second, they argue that the 
question of retroactivity need not even arise because the rule 
announced in Shelton III is not new.  Finally, they argue that 
even if the rule announced in Shelton III is new, the District 
Court should have applied the general rule that litigants who 
bring about a change or clarification in the law are entitled to 
the benefit of that new rule.  We consider each of those 
arguments in turn. 
 
 A. Whether Shelton III Addressed Retroactivity  
 
 As just noted, the Plaintiffs contend that Shelton III 
already determined the retroactive effect to be accorded that 
decision, and that, if not, we should certify the issue of 
                                              
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2)(A); we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6).  Pearson, 775 F.3d at 601.  When a district 
court dismisses on the basis of an affirmative defense, as is 
the case here, we will affirm only when the defense is 
“apparent on the face of the complaint” and documents relied 
on in the complaint.  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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retroactivity to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  The 
Plaintiffs correctly observe that Shelton III contains several 
passages that suggest the Supreme Court of New Jersey was 
applying its ruling to the parties before it.  For example, when 
it reformulated the questions of law that we certified, it 
phrased each new question in terms of whether 
“Restaurant.com’s coupons” fell within the relevant statutory 
terms.  Shelton III, 70 A.3d at 549.  Similarly, it stated that its 
“task [was] to define ‘property’ in order to determine whether 
the certificates offered by Restaurant.com are within the 
scope of the TCCWNA,” id. at 550, “whether the certificates 
offered by Restaurant.com qualify as property ‘which is 
primarily for personal, family or household purposes,’” id. at 
554, and “whether the coupons or certificates issued by 
Restaurant.com to plaintiffs are ‘written consumer 
contract[s]’ or whether the coupons ‘gave or displayed any 
written consumer warranty, notice or sign,’” id. at 555.  
Although the court concluded its opinion with a generic 
summary of its legal rulings, id. at 558-59, it followed that 
summary with the following case-specific language: 
 
Thus, plaintiffs can properly be considered 
“consumers” within the scope of the TCCWNA 
because the certificates acquired by them 
through the Restaurant.com website are 
property primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes.  Further, in construing the 
plain language of the terms of the TCCWNA 
and the Act’s relationship to the Plain Language 
Act, we conclude the certificates purchased 
from Restaurant.com can be considered 
“consumer contracts[,]” and the standard terms 
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provided on the certificates can be considered 
“notices” subject to the TCCWNA. 
 
Id. at 559.  In other words, the court stated, “The statute as 
drafted … covers the certificates in question.”  Id.    
 
 While Shelton III spoke in terms of the TCCWNA’s 
application to Restaurant.com, nothing in that opinion 
expressly addresses the issue of retroactivity.  None of New 
Jersey’s cases on retroactivity are cited, nor is the test for 
departing from the general rule of retroactivity mentioned.  
Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent Shelton 
III is silent as to its retroactive effect, its intent is clear and we 
should presume that the Supreme Court of New Jersey meant 
for its interpretation of the TCCWNA to be retroactive.     
 
 New Jersey law suggests that any appellate opinion 
that considers remedial issues in the course of its analysis, or 
remands for consideration of such issues, ordinarily 
contemplates retroactive application to the parties in that case.  
The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted that approach 
when it addressed one of its cases that had been reviewed by 
the United States Supreme Court: 
 
Although the [United States] Supreme Court’s 
opinion is silent on the issue of retrospective 
application, the remand to this Court to 
determine severability and “for further 
proceedings” carries with it the implicit 
direction that we determine the relief 
appropriate to the holding that the [legislation at 
issue] is partially pre-empted.  If the Court 
conceived that its decision might apply only 
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prospectively, which would significantly affect 
the remedy we must fashion, it is reasonable to 
assume that the opinion would at least have 
adverted to that possibility.  
 
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 534 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1987).   
 
 In the Plaintiffs’ view, that reasoning should guide us 
here.  But it cannot.  That reasoning is sound when 
applicable, but it is plainly not applicable in the context of an 
opinion given on certification.  The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey was not called upon to directly fashion a remedy or 
resolve the Plaintiffs’ case.  Nor did it sit as an appellate 
tribunal reviewing a decision of the federal courts and 
remanding for a determination of the appropriate remedy.  
See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (defining appellate jurisdiction as “the 
revision of a decision of an inferior court”); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(“It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it 
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already 
instituted … .”).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court itself put 
it in Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, “[t]he purpose of the 
certification process is to answer the question of law 
submitted pursuant to [New Jersey Rule of Court] 2:12A, not 
to resolve … factual differences.”  912 A.2d 104, 108 (N.J. 
2006).  In Delta Funding, the court addressed how the facts of 
that case interacted with the legal principles governing 
arbitration agreements, id. at 111-12, but it clarified that it did 
so in furtherance of its effort to “identify general principles of 
New Jersey contract law that the Third Circuit and the 




 Certified questions should be such as to “control the 
outcome of a case pending in the federal court.”  L.A.R. 
110.1; see also N.J. R. 2:12A-1 (providing that the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has authority to accept a certified 
question from our court “if the answer may be determinative 
of an issue in litigation pending in the Third Circuit”).  But 
there is a distinction between deciding a controlling legal 
issue and resolving a dispute.  In answering the certified 
question, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was not applying 
the law to the facts of this case in the sense that it was 
resolving a dispute among litigants.  That can only be done by 
a court with jurisdiction over the dispute itself, and 
jurisdiction, coupled with the mutual respect inherent in the 
seeking and granting of certification of a controlling question 
of law, circumscribes the opinion rendered.  The Supreme 
Court of Utah has insightfully provided a state-court 
perspective on the process: 
 
We routinely refer to surrounding facts and 
circumstances not just to set the stage for our 
resolution of questions certified by federal 
courts, but also to illustrate the application of 
our answer in the context of the case. 
 
That is not to say that our opinion on 
certification will itself resolve the underlying 
federal case.  The resolution of the parties’ 
competing claims and arguments will be up to 
the federal courts, which of course retain 
jurisdiction to decide this case under the law as 
they see it. … Those courts retain the 
independent authority to decide whether and to 
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what extent to apply our law or to recognize 
limitations on or caveats to it. 
 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Horne, 289 P.3d 502, 505-06 (Utah 2012) (Lee, J.) 
(footnote and paragraph numbering omitted)); cf. Nemours 
Found. v. Manganaro Corp., 878 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(stating that an order of the district court certifying a question 
to the Delaware Supreme Court “does not mean the effective 
end of the federal litigation.  Further proceedings, including 
possibly a trial on the merits, will be held in the district court 
after the Delaware Supreme Court either answers the certified 
questions or declines to accept them.”).  Thus, despite the 
Plaintiffs’ insistence to the contrary, Shelton III could not and 
did not adjudicate the question of retroactivity, and we doubt 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court intended any such thing. 
 
 We also doubt the wisdom of returning to that court 
with the question of retroactivity.  We have already imposed 
upon it once in this case, and it graciously answered our call 
for help in clarifying the scope of the TCCWNA.  We are no 
longer faced with a “[n]ovel, unsettled question[] of state 
law,” which is a prerequisite for certification.  Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997).  
Certification would be inappropriate here – indeed, it would 
serve no purpose – because the requirements of New Jersey 
law on the issue of retroactivity are clear.  All that remains is 
to apply them to the acknowledged facts.  It appears that, in 
essence, the Plaintiffs are attempting to escape the effect of 
the removal of their case to federal court and would like to 
have the Supreme Court of New Jersey adjudicate the matter.  
They chose a state forum in the first instance, so their efforts 
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are perhaps understandable, but we are not free to shirk our 
responsibility to decide what is properly before us. 
 
 B. New Rule 
 
 The Plaintiffs next challenge the District Court’s 
determination that Shelton III established a new rule of law.  
They argue that there was no old rule from which the court 
could have departed; rather, the law was silent on the issue, 
which, they say, prevents Shelton III from constituting a 
“new” rule.     
 
 There is a ringing lack of logic in that assertion.  
Things are commonly understood as “new” not only when 
contrasted with something “old” but when they are, in 
themselves, without precedent.  Thus, while it is true that, 
“[u]nless a new rule of law is at issue, the Court need not 
engage in retroactivity analysis,” US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Guillaume, 38 A.3d 570, 585 n.3 (N.J. 2012), it is not true 
that a “new rule” only arises when it supplants an old one.  
An opinion establishes a “new” rule “‘either by overruling 
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, … or 
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was 
not clearly foreshadowed.’”  Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co. 
(“Coons II”),3 476 A.2d 763, 768 (N.J. 1984) (omission in 
original; emphasis added) (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 
                                              
 3 Coons II involved a rehearing of Coons v. American 
Honda Motor Co. (“Coons I”), 463 A.2d 921 (N.J. 1983), to 
revisit the retroactivity ruling of that earlier opinion.  Because 
New Jersey case law consistently uses the appellation “Coons 
II” to refer to the later opinion, regardless of whether Coons I 
has been discussed, we do the same. 
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404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)); accord In re Contest of Nov. 8, 
2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 40 A.3d 
684, 707 (N.J. 2012).  “Generally, an issue of statutory 
construction that implicates an established practice and that 
courts have not yet addressed presents an issue of first 
impression.”  Henderson v. Camden Cnty. Mun. Util. Auth., 
826 A.2d 615, 620 (N.J. 2003). 
 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Shelton 
III was not foreshadowed by an unambiguous reading of the 
text of the statute or by other state court decisions.  As we 
stated in our certification order, “The panel has examined the 
decisions of the courts of the State of New Jersey and found 
no decision that addresses the question of how the term 
‘property’ is defined in the TCCWNA.”  Shelton II, 2011 WL 
10844972, at *1.  We explained that only one case “addressed 
the question of whether gift certificates were considered 
property, and that case did not involve the TCCWNA,” nor 
was there anything in that case from which we could “infer 
what the Supreme Court of New Jersey would say regarding 
the question of tangible and intangible property in the context 
of the TCCWNA.”  Shelton II, 2011 WL 10844972, at *3.  
Furthermore, we noted that “the Legislature did not expressly 
omit gift certificates from the types of property covered by 
the TCCWNA,” and determining the import of that silence 
was complicated by the fact that a separate act, the Gift 
Certificate Act, “specifically addresses restrictions on gift 
certificates.”  Id. at *4.  Nothing in Shelton III contradicts our 
earlier assessment.  Because the rule announced in Shelton III 
was not foreshadowed by the case law or an unambiguous 
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statute, it qualifies as new.4  We must therefore determine 
whether the District Court properly limited the rule to purely 
prospective application. 
 
 C. Equitable Analysis 
 
 Under New Jersey law, judicial decisions that adopt 
new rules are generally given retroactive effect.  Coons II, 
476 A.2d at 767.  Courts may, however, depart from that 
general rule when they determine that “retroactive application 
could produce substantial inequitable results.”  Selective Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 34 A.3d 769, 773 (N.J. 2012).  To 
determine “what is just and consonant with public policy in 
the particular situation presented,” courts generally consider 
three factors:  “(1) justifiable reliance by the parties and the 
community as a whole on prior decisions, (2) a determination 
                                              
 4 One case may be read as implying that an issue of 
first impression is not involved when a court “merely 
applie[s] existing rules to a new factual variant.”  See 
Malinowski v. Jacobs, 915 A.2d 513, 515 (N.J. 2007) 
(referring to the opinion of the dissenting judge of the 
intermediate appellate court, and, after discussing that 
dissenting opinion at length, stating that the court was 
reversing “substantially for the reasons given by” that 
dissenting judge).  Taken to an extreme, such a reading might 
undermine the principle that an unprecedented circumstance 
can produce an application of law so novel as to be “new” for 
purposes of retroactivity.  Even under that formulation of the 
test, however, our conclusion is the same:  given our 
statements in Shelton II and the analysis in Shelton III, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey was not simply applying 
settled law to a new factual variant. 
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that the purpose of the new rule will not be advanced by 
retroactive application, and (3) a potentially adverse effect 
retrospectivity may have on the administration of justice.”  
Coons II, 476 A.2d at 767; see also In re Contest of Nov. 8, 
2011 Gen. Election, 40 A.3d at 707 (focusing on the purpose 
and impact of the new rule); Selective Ins., 34 A.3d at 773 
(focusing on reasonable reliance).  “Depending upon the facts 
of a case, one of the factors may be pivotal.”  Rutherford 
Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Rutherford, Bergen 
Cnty., 489 A.2d 1148, 1156 (N.J. 1985).  Once those factors 
are taken into account, there are four ways to proceed:  
 
“(1) make the new rule of law purely 
prospective, applying it only to cases whose 
operative facts arise after the new rule is 
announced; (2) apply the new rule to future 
cases and to the parties in the case announcing 
the new rule, while applying the old rule to all 
other pending and past litigation; (3) grant the 
new rule limited retroactivity, applying it to 
cases in (1) and (2) as well as to pending cases 
where the parties have not yet exhausted all 
avenues of direct review; and, finally, (4) give 
the new rule complete retroactive effect, 
applying it to all cases, even those where final 
judgments have been entered and all avenues of 
direct review exhausted.” 
 
Coons II, 476 A.2d at 767 (quoting State v. Burstein, 427 
A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1981)).   
 
 The Plaintiffs of course challenge the District Court’s 
ruling that Shelton III should be given purely prospective 
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application. They first argue that Restaurant.com did not 
carry its burden to demonstrate actual, reasonable reliance on 
an earlier interpretation of the law.  On a related note, they 
say that, because there was no record developed to support 
the conclusion that it would be inequitable to apply the new 
rule retroactively, it was error for the District Court to refuse 
retroactive effect.  The Plaintiffs next contend that the District 
Court erred by not applying the general rule that parties who 
successfully push for a clarification of the law are entitled to 
application of the new law to their case, even when full 
retroactivity is inappropriate.  They argue that the District 
Court’s reasoning for departing from the general rule – 
namely, that application to the Plaintiffs would result in a 
“windfall” because Restaurant.com may have to pay statutory 
damages and attorney fees when there were no actual 
damages – was insufficient as a matter of law.  While the first 
of those arguments – the one focused on reasonable reliance – 
is not persuasive, the second – concerning the propriety of 
statutory damages – is. 
 
  1. Reasonable Reliance 
 
 New Jersey precedent calls on courts to consider the 
impact that retroactive application of a new rule would have 
on those who have reasonably relied on a contrary 
interpretation of the law.  See SASCO 1997 NI, LLC v. 
Zudkewich, 767 A.2d 469, 477 (N.J. 2001) (considering the 
financial impact of a new rule on “the entire commercial 
lending industry” when the new rule invalidated “a practice 
apparently dominant throughout the industry”); Rutherford 
Educ. Ass’n, 489 A.2d at 1159 (noting that retroactive 
application “may have serious consequences on the tax 
structure of many communities and other community 
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services”).  Reliance on a contrary interpretation of the law is 
reasonable “when a court renders a first-instance or clarifying 
decision in a murky or uncertain area of the law.”  Montells, 
627 A.2d at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[A] 
party seeking to avoid retrospective application of a decision 
must show actual reliance on a contrary principle of law.”  
New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm’n v. Citizens to 
Make Mayor-Council Gov’t Work, 526 A.2d 1069, 1074 (N.J. 
1987) (emphasis omitted). 
 
 The quantum of evidence required to show actual 
reliance depends on the nature of the inquiry in each case.  
Compare Selective Ins., 34 A.3d at 773-74 (noting that the 
record was “largely devoid of evidence” that “might imply 
that there was general reliance on the interpretation of the 
statute and regulations that we have found wanting” or that 
“anyone other than this defendant found the law in this regard 
to be ‘murky’ or so uncertain that a retroactive application of 
our judgment would be manifestly unjust”), with Rutherford 
Educ. Ass’n, 489 A.2d at 1159 (noting that the court had 
examined the record, and that there was “no question that in 
this case the school boards acted properly and in good faith in 
relying on prior law,” but also assuming that boards of 
education in general acted similarly).  In appropriate cases, 
“[s]ome level of generality” may be required, and common 
sense inferences may be drawn to determine whether a 
practice is widespread or whether defendants relied on a 
contrary interpretation of the law.  Coons II, 476 A.2d at 772.  
For example, in a case involving a statute of limitations 
tolling provision that had been struck down, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey noted that, “given the nature of th[e] 
statute” in question, one would be “justified in presuming” 
that many plaintiffs had not brought challenges under the 
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belief that the pertinent statute of limitations had been tolled.  
Id.   
 
 The District Court in this case did not err by 
presuming that businesses similarly situated to 
Restaurant.com had been operating with the understanding 
that the TCCWNA did not apply to intangible property.  
Under Shelton III’s interpretation of the TCCWNA, 
businesses may not sell gift certificates and other intangible 
property intended for household use if they indicate that 
certain provisions – such as expiration dates – “may be void, 
unenforceable, or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without 
specifying which provisions are or are not void, 
unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New 
Jersey.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:12-16; Shelton III, 70 A.3d at 
558-59.  The District Court determined that reliance on 
competing interpretations of the TCCWNA was reasonable.  
It had initially ruled that, because the gift certificates in 
question were simply “a contingent right to a discount,” 
Shelton I, 2010 WL 2384923, at *5, the Plaintiffs were not 
consumers within the meaning of the TCCWNA.  Although 
ultimately incorrect, that interpretation was reasonable.  It is 
safe to assume, without more specific proof, that many 
internet retailers selling intangible property intended for 
household use would likewise have considered the 
requirements of the TCCWNA and concluded that gift 
certificates and other intangible property qualify as contingent 
rights rather than “property” under that statute. 
 
 Furthermore, the District Court correctly determined 
that the impact of a fully retroactive application of Shelton III 
would be widespread.  Shelton III has the potential to affect 
not only Restaurant.com, but also any business – including 
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internet retailers located in any part of the world – that 
markets intangible property to consumers in New Jersey.  
Specific proof of the extent of Shelton III’s impact was not 
necessary here, since common sense reveals that its impact 
will be truly far-reaching.  The District Court thus correctly 
refused to apply the general rule of full retroactivity.  
 
  2. Propriety of Statutory Damages for the  
   Named Plaintiffs 
 
 Even though full retroactivity is not appropriate here, it 
does not follow that the new rule should be applied purely 
prospectively.  Instead, New Jersey courts generally apply a 
new rule at least to the litigants whose efforts helped produce 
it.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained that, 
 
[b]alanced against [the factors of reasonable 
reliance, the purpose of the rule, and the rule’s 
impact] is our belief that those responsible for 
effecting a change in the law should benefit 
from their efforts.  Accordingly, we have 
recognized that purely prospective rulings fail 
to reward litigants for their efforts and fail to 
further the broader goal of providing an 
inducement to challenge existing interpretations 
of the law.  It has long been our position that 
fundamental fairness generally requires that 
champions of the cause should be rewarded for 
their effort and expense in challenging existing 
law. 
 
Rutherford Educ. Ass’n, 489 A.2d at 1158; accord James v. 
Bd. of Trustees of Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 753 A.2d 1061, 1072 
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(N.J. 2000); Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Const. Co., 735 
A.2d 1142, 1150-51 (N.J. 1999).  For example, in Henderson 
v. Camden County Municipal Utility Authority, the court 
determined in a putative class action that a new rule 
prohibiting utilities from charging compound interest should 
not be given full retroactive effect because charging 
compound interest was a widespread, long-standing, 
established practice.  826 A.2d at 620.  Nevertheless, the 
court decided that, even though the class would not receive 
the benefit of the new rule, the named plaintiff would, 
“because of her efforts in litigating [the] appeal.”  Id. at 621. 
 
 Here, the District Court rejected that approach.  It 
decided that, because the Plaintiffs had suffered no 
“ascertainable loss” and there had been reasonable reliance on 
a contrary interpretation of the law, it would be unjust for 
Restaurant.com to have to pay “windfall statutory damages 
and attorneys’ fees.”  (App. at 13.)  The Court quite rightly 
was concerned with whether the purpose of the new rule 
would be best served by something less than full retroactive 
effect.  Coons II, 476 A.2d at 767.  But the Court’s emphasis 
on what it deemed the “windfall” nature of the Plaintiffs’ 
recovery was misplaced.  As explained in Shelton III,  “the 
TCCWNA is a remedial statute, entitled to a broad 
interpretation to facilitate its stated purpose,” 70 A.3d at 558, 
and the New Jersey legislature decided to impose a civil 
penalty as a “deterrent,” id., to effectuate that purpose – “to 
prevent deceptive practices in consumer contracts by 
prohibiting the use of illegal terms or warranties in consumer 
contracts,” id. at 549 (quoting Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. 
Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 25 A.3d 1027, 1044 (N.J. 2011)).  
We cannot disregard the legislature’s choice to award 
statutory damages in the absence of actual damages.  See 
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Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940) (“How to 
effectuate policy – the adaptation of means to legitimately 
sought ends – is one of the most intractable of legislative 
problems.  Whether proscribed conduct is to be deterred by 
qui tam action or triple damages or injunction, or by criminal 
prosecution, or merely by defense to actions in contract, or by 
some, or all, of these remedies in combination, is a matter 
within the legislature’s range of choice.”).  If it is a windfall, 
it is one purposefully and lawfully provided.  It is true that 
New Jersey law indicates there may be cases where a 
defendant’s reliance interests and other equities are such that 
a new rule should be applied purely prospectively.  See Tax 
Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 522-23 
(N.J. 2006) (applying new rule prospectively, with the result 
that a settlement agreement that plaintiff was trying to void 
was enforced).  But whatever those circumstances may be, 
this is not such a case. 
 
 That does not mean, however, that the District Court 
could not limit the extent of the windfall.  The approach taken 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henderson is 
instructive.  Retroactive application was limited to the named 
plaintiffs, and that option is available here.  By following that 
approach, the otherwise significant financial impact on 
Restaurant.com and other potential defendants would be more 




 Although the District Court correctly determined that 
the new rule announced in Shelton III is not fully retroactive, 
it erred by failing to apply that new rule to the Plaintiffs, 
Shelton and Bohus.  We will therefore reverse the judgment 
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and remand the case for entry of an order giving the two 
named plaintiffs the benefit of the new rule of law that their 
efforts helped to create. 
